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This note provides guidance on how to calibrate 
fiscal rules; that is, how to determine the thresholds 
(ceiling, floor, or target) for specific fiscal aggregates 
constrained by rules. The note focuses, more specif-
ically, on the calibration of the debt, balance, and 
expenditure rules.
It is one of two guidance notes on the design of fis-
cal rules; the other note focuses on rule selection (IMF, 
2018). The two exercises are linked: if a fiscal frame-
work had to be built from scratch, rules would need to 
be selected and calibrated at the same time. However, 
to simplify the analysis and because some countries 
already have fiscal rules embedded in their laws, this 
note examines the issue of calibration on its own.
The note is not exhaustive or definitive. There are 
many approaches to determining thresholds for rules. 
This note presents a selection of methods that are 
intuitive, are simple to implement, and leave room for 
policy judgment. The methods are based on past IMF 
work, including analytic and policy papers, technical 
assistance missions, and training. Future work might 
enhance or modify the framework presented here. 
Another important point is that the objective of this 
note is to provide practical guidance; it is not a substi-
tute for the use of full-fledged macroeconomic models, 
which have the potential to capture all macroeconomic 
and fiscal implications of alternative calibrations.
The note is divided into four sections. The first sec-
tion discusses general principles used to calibrate rules. 
The second section reports international evidence on 
the numerical ceilings used in existing rules. The third 
and fourth sections provide guidance on the calibration 
of the debt ceiling and the operational rules (fiscal bal-
ance and expenditure rules). EViews econometric and 
Excel files and manuals accompany this note to assist 
economists with country-specific calibration exercises. 
They are available upon request from the authors.
This note was prepared by a team led by Luc Eyraud and includ-
ing Anja Baum, Andrew Hodge, Mariusz Jarmuzek, Young Kim, 
Samba Mbaye, and Elif Ture. The note received useful comments 
from IMF staff.
General Principles for Calibration of Rules
The calibration methodology presented in this note 
is based on four general principles:1
 • Calibration should be comprehensive and consis-
tent. Most countries have more than one fiscal
rule (Schaechter and others 2012). To minimize
the risks of inconsistency and conflict among
rules, the fiscal framework should be assessed as a
whole and the thresholds should be calibrated in
a consistent manner. In particular, there should
be a clear relationship between the debt and fiscal
balance ceilings.
 • Calibration should be sequenced. By analogy with
monetary policy, a well-designed fiscal framework
could set targets for both final and intermediate
objectives of fiscal policy. Therefore, the frame-
work could be structured around two types of rules
(Eyraud and Wu 2015). The first type, called fiscal
anchor, ensures that the framework achieves its
final objective, which is to preserve fiscal sus-
tainability; a natural candidate is a ceiling on the
debt-to-GDP ratio.2 The framework should also
include operational rules that are under the con-
trol of governments while also having a close and
predictable link to debt dynamics (for instance, a
ceiling on the fiscal deficit or a cap on expenditure).
One implication of this dual structure is that the
calibration exercise should be sequenced (see Box 1
for a summary of the overall approach developed in
this paper). The debt ceiling should preferably be set
first, taking into account debt sustainability and the
need to protect the country against adverse shocks.
Then the operational rules can be calibrated from
the debt ceiling.
1These principles apply to the exercise of rule calibration, not rule 
selection. The note “How to Select Fiscal Rules—A Primer” (IMF, 
2018) presents criteria to assess the strengths and weaknesses of 
various fiscal rules, including their ability to strike a balance between 
sustainability and stabilization objectives, ease of monitoring, sim-
plicity, resilience to shocks, and link to the budget process.
2While fiscal rules can serve different goals, the focus here is 
primarily on rules that promote fiscal sustainability.
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 • Calibration should be prudent. Governments should
take fiscal risks into account in setting fiscal targets
and should preserve buffers to accommodate
shocks. Not all risks can be mitigated, insured,
or provisioned for through contingency funds in
the budget; therefore, it is essential to create fiscal
headroom by setting prudent debt and deficit ceil-
ings (IMF 2016).
 • Calibration should be updated regularly but not too
frequently. Fiscal rules are designed to be robust to
macroeconomic shocks, but conditions may evolve
over time. For example, a government might change
the way it responds to debt developments and the
output gap. Countries that have had procyclical
fiscal policies in the past may gradually move toward
a countercyclical stance (Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin
2013). The calibration should therefore be periodi-
cally updated. But the update process should not be 
too frequent; what separates rules from annual bud-
get targets is that rules are long-lasting constraints 
on fiscal policy. According to the IMF definition, 
rules are numerical targets fixed in legislation that 
are binding for a minimum of three years. A review 
of fiscal rules could, for instance, be part of the 
electoral cycle (Schaechter and others 2012).
International Experience on Fiscal 
Rule Thresholds
Fiscal rules have become more common worldwide 
over the past two decades. In the early 1990s, only five 
countries had fiscal rules in place. By the end of 2015, 
the number of countries with at least one national or 
supranational fiscal rule surged to 92, of which more 
Box Figure 1. How to Calibrate Fiscal Rules in ree Steps
Step 1. Calibrate the Public Debt Ceiling
Method 1. Method 2.
When maximum debt limit is known When maximum debt limit is unknown
Step 2. Calibrate the Structural Balance Rule
Method 1. Method 2.
Hitting the debt target in the long term Hitting the debt target by a given date
Step 3. Calibrate the Expenditure Rule
Method 1. Method 2.
Expenditure growth rule Expenditure ratio rule
Method 3. Method 4.
Hitting the debt target by a given date
following a transition period
Hitting the debt target by a given date
after a period of scal buer buildup
Optional: Derive the Corresponding Nominal Balance Rule
Box 1. How to Calibrate Fiscal Rules in Three Steps
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than 60 percent were emerging market and developing 
economies.3
Ceilings on public debt are a common feature of 
rule-based fiscal frameworks. As of 2015, about 70 
countries worldwide had a fiscal framework with an 
explicit cap on public debt. Debt rules are generally 
set in gross rather than net terms (gross debt minus 
financial assets) because it is hard to determine which 
government assets are truly liquid, particularly in times 
of financial stress. Also, the concept of net debt is less 
transparent than gross debt and more difficult to com-
municate to the public.
Gross debt ceilings can vary significantly across 
countries, but frequently range between 60 percent 
and 70 percent of GDP (Figure 1). The clustering of 
ceilings around these values reflects the strong repre-
sentation of supranational rules. About three-quarters 
of countries with a debt ceiling are members of supra-
national unions. For instance, the European Union 
and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union impose a 
debt ceiling of 60 percent of GDP, while the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community and the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union both 
impose a cap of 70 percent of GDP on public debt. 
In the East African Community, member countries 
have adopted a debt ceiling of 50 percent of GDP in 
net present value terms during the convergence process 
toward the East African Monetary Union. Excluding 
3The stylized facts presented in this section are based on the 2017 
version of the IMF Fiscal Rules Database, available at http:// www 
.imf .org/ external/ datamapper/ fiscalrules/ map/ map .htm. It covers 96 
advanced, emerging, and developing economies.
supranational rules, the 60 percent threshold remains 
the most common among national debt rules. 
Most fiscal frameworks rely on additional rules to 
operationalize their debt ceilings. This occurs because 
debt trajectories are not directly controlled by poli-
cymakers. More than 80 percent of countries with a 
debt ceiling also have rules imposing constraints on the 
(nominal or structural) budget balance; among those, 
almost a third also have expenditure ceilings in their 
fiscal frameworks. For nominal budget balance rules, 
the 3 percent deficit ceiling is dominant through-
out the world; it has been adopted by the European 
Union, the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union, and the East African Community (Figure 2). 
With regard to structural budget balance rules,4 
ceilings have a wider distribution (Figure 3). The con-
centration of deficit ceilings between 0 and 1 reflects 
the adoption of medium-term budgetary objectives 
(MTOs) in European Union countries, as well as the 
structural balance ceiling (using average oil revenues 
instead of actual oil revenues) used in the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community. A few 
countries impose two structural deficit ceilings—one 
at the supranational level and another at the national 
level—possibly with different thresholds. For instance, 
Germany has structural deficit ceilings of 0.5 percent 
of GDP (supranational medium-term objective) and 
0.35 percent of GDP for the federal government 
(national rule). 
4In this note, structural balance rules are defined as rules that 
correct the nominal fiscal balance for cyclical and transitory factors 
(including, in some cases, the commodity price cycle).
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Figure 1. Distribution of Public Debt Ceilings
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Expenditure rules are less common than debt or 
budget balance rules. These rules appear in several 
forms (Cordes and others 2015). In a majority of cases, 
expenditure rules consist of an explicit cap on nom-
inal or real expenditure growth. Expenditure growth 
is capped either by a fixed numerical ceiling (in the 
range of 2 percent to 4 percent for real growth rules in 
our sample) or by a measure of medium- to long-term 
growth. In a few emerging market economies, expen-
diture rules apply to the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, 
with ceilings in the range of 30 percent to 40 percent 
of GDP. At the supranational level, only the European 
Union has imposed an expenditure rule on member 
states. This rule, called the expenditure benchmark, 
caps the annual growth of primary expenditure with 
long-term nominal GDP growth (European Commis-
sion, 2016). One of its characteristics is that it also 
corrects for revenue measures, meaning that spending 
growth cannot exceed medium-term growth unless the 
additional spending is matched by new discretionary 
revenue measures.
Calibrating the Public Debt Ceiling
This section outlines how to set the ceiling of the 
fiscal anchor (the debt ratio), with an approach based 
on precautionary considerations. Countries face sudden 
increases in debt because of negative macroeconomic 
shocks and the realization of contingent liabilities. 
One way to calibrate the debt ratio is to ensure with 
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high probability that debt is kept under control despite 
these shocks (for a general discussion, see IMF 2016).
Specifically, this section presents two alternative 
methods. The first method assumes that there is 
a known maximum debt limit beyond which debt 
dynamics spiral out of control. This method was 
developed by Debrun, Jarmuzek, and Shabunina 
(2017) for advanced and emerging market economies, 
while Baum and others (2017) adapted the method to 
low-income countries. In this approach, the debt rule 
ceiling should be set low enough to ensure with high 
probability that debt will remain below the debt limit 
even when negative shocks occur. The second method 
does not rely on an explicit debt limit; it selects the 
debt ceiling so that debt can be stabilized following 
negative shocks without breaching a policy limit—a 
maximum feasible level of the primary balance.
The debt ceiling set using either of these meth-
ods can be based on any institutional coverage (for 
example, central or general government).5 However, 
it is important to ensure that the same institutional 
coverage is used throughout the calibration exercise. 
In other words, if the debt ceiling is computed for the 
central government, the related deficit and expenditure 
ceilings will also apply to the central government.
This section presents the two methods in an intui-
tive way. More details on the algorithms and formulas 
are provided in Appendix 1 and the manuals accompa-
nying this note.
Method One: Calibrating the Debt Rule Ceiling When the 
Maximum Debt Limit Is Known
In this method, stochastic simulations are used to 
calibrate the debt rule ceiling by computing a safety 
margin below a known debt limit. The calibration is 
done in three steps. The first step is to identify the 
maximum debt limit. Second, the distribution of 
macroeconomic and fiscal shocks is estimated and 
used to simulate potential debt trajectories over a 
medium-term projection horizon. The results of these 
simulations are summarized in a fan chart. The third 
step identifies the debt rule ceiling, which is a suf-
ficiently low starting level for debt (in the first year 
of the projection horizon) such that there is a safety 
margin and debt will remain below the maximum debt 
limit over the medium term with high probability, 
5IMF (2009) provides guidance about the appropriate institu-
tional coverage of fiscal rules.
despite the potential for negative shocks. The debt rule 
ceiling is computed as the maximum debt limit minus 
the safety margin.
This method was developed by Debrun and others 
(2017) and Baum and others (2017). Earlier research 
on stochastic simulations of debt trajectories includes 
IMF (2003a), Ferrucci and Penalver (2003), Garcia 
and Rigobon (2004), and Celasun, Debrun, and Ostry 
(2007). The following paragraphs describe the three 
steps in greater detail.
Step 1: Setting the Debt Limit
In the first step, an assumption is made on the 
maximum debt limit, which is country-specific and 
can depend on many factors. There are many ways to 
set the maximum level of debt that a country does not 
wish to cross. Given the lack of consensus in the lit-
erature, a sensitivity analysis based on alternative debt 
limit estimates could be warranted. The following are 
two possible approaches.6
 • Risk of debt distress. The debt limit could be thought
of as the level beyond which it is believed that a
debt distress episode will occur with heightened
probability (for example, default, restructuring, or
large increases in sovereign spreads). For instance,
for emerging market economies and advanced
economies, the IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis
(DSA) framework for Market Access Countries uses
benchmarks of 70 percent and 85 percent of GDP,
respectively (IMF 2013a). For low-income countries,
the IMF DSA framework has benchmarks for public
debt in nominal terms in the range of 49 percent
to 75 percent,7 depending on institutional quality
(IMF and World Bank 2012).
 • Risk of growth slowdown. The debt limit can be cho-
sen as the level beyond which it is believed growth
will decline. For instance, Cecchetti, Mohanty, and
Zampolli (2011) find that debt becomes a drag on
growth when it exceeds around 85 percent of GDP
in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries. See Cottarelli
6For a conceptual framework on debt limits as well as empirical 
estimates, see Ghosh and others (2013).
7The corresponding benchmarks for the present value of public 
debt range from 38 percent to 74 percent of GDP: IMF(2013b). 
For low-income countries, the present value of debt can differ from 
its nominal value, particularly in countries that rely on concessional 
external debt, where the nominal value may be a poor indicator of 
the debt service burden in the near term.
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and Jaramillo (2012) for further discussion of the 
relationship between public debt and growth.
Step 2: Estimating the Effect of Shocks on Debt
The second step is to perform stochastic simulations 
to gauge the potential impact of macroeconomic and 
fiscal shocks on debt over the medium term. This 
requires estimating the joint distribution of macro-
economic variables (Box 2).8 The set of variables to 
include in the joint distribution varies by country 
group. For advanced and emerging market economies, 
the econometric files accompanying this note use GDP 
growth, interest rates on government debt, and the 
exchange rate; for low-income developing countries, 
the terms of trade gap and disbursements of foreign 
loans are also included. Multiple simulations are car-
ried out using the joint distribution.9 Each simulation 
8The joint distribution can be specified using either a Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) or by directly calibrating a joint normal (or 
Student’s t) distribution based on historical co-movement between 
variables. Alternatively, if these variables are expected to have differ-
ent means to those observed in the past, the programs attached to 
this note allow the user to specify manually the mean of the forecast 
variables around which shocks are added. See Box 2 and Appendix 1 
for more details.
9In both Methods One and Two, the macroeconomic shocks are 
drawn from symmetric (normal or Student’s t) distributions. This 
does not reflect empirical evidence that shocks can be skewed to the 
downside in reality (Escolano and Gaspar 2016). Nonetheless, the 
fan charts may be asymmetric, because the impact of the shocks on 
debt paths (in the form of automatic debt dynamics) depends on the 
produces a path for macroeconomic variables over a 
medium-term projection horizon, where the variables 
have been subject to shocks in each period. 
Medium-term debt trajectories consistent with 
each simulated path of macroeconomic variables are 
obtained from the system of simultaneous equations 
formed by the debt accumulation equation (that is, the 
government budget constraint) and a Fiscal Reaction 
Function (FRF) in which the level of the primary bal-
ance may respond to the level of debt and realizations 
of macroeconomic variables (see Box 3 for a discussion 
of the choice of the function). The fiscal reaction func-
tion includes a fiscal shock realized each period.10 Debt 
trajectories produced using stochastic simulations can 
be summarized in a fan chart. 
Step 3: Calibrating the Debt Ceiling
The final step is to calibrate the debt rule ceiling. 
This is done by choosing an initial level of debt (in the 
first projection year) so that debt remains below the 
maximum debt limit with a chosen probability over 
the medium term, despite the occurrence of negative 
level of debt. For example, an adverse shock on the interest-growth 
differential will increase debt by more when the initial debt 
level is higher.
10The distribution of fiscal shocks is calibrated based on deviations 
between actual fiscal responses observed (that is, actual levels of 
the primary balance) and the fiscal response predicted by the FRF 
over the sample.
The econometric files accompanying this note allow 
three possibilities for simulating macroeconomic vari-
ables over the medium-term forecast horizon.
VAR forecasts. An econometric Vector Autoregres-
sion (VAR) model is estimated for key macroeconomic 
variables at a quarterly frequency. Multiple potential 
trajectories for these variables are obtained by gener-
ating forecasts with the estimated VAR model, adding 
shocks each period. The shocks are drawn from a dis-
tribution calibrated using the estimated VAR residuals 
(and their estimated variance-covariance matrix). The 
VAR methodology works best when quarterly macro-
economic data are available, providing a sufficiently 
large sample size for econometric estimation.
Drawing directly from the joint distribution. If 
only annual data are available, a joint normal (or Stu-
dent’s t) distribution of the macroeconomic variables 
can be calibrated using the historical sample mean, 
variance, and covariance of these variables as param-
eters. Multiple potential trajectories of the macro-
economic variables are generated by drawing shocks 
directly from the joint distribution.
Forecasting with ad hoc path of macroeconomic 
variables. The user may specify a mean for each of 
the macroeconomic variables in each period of the 
forecast horizon. These mean values may corre-
spond to the user’s own forecast. Multiple potential 
trajectories of the macroeconomic variables can then 
be generated by adding shocks around the manually 
entered mean values. The shocks are produced by 
drawing from the joint distribution of the variables 
(described in the previous paragraph).
Box 2. Simulating Macroeconomic Variables
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A fiscal reaction function (FRF) is a rule linking a 
particular level of the primary balance to prevailing 
macroeconomic and fiscal conditions. Different spec-
ifications of the FRF can be used depending on the 
scope of the calibration exercise:
 • If the fiscal framework has only one rule—a debt
rule—it makes sense to calibrate the debt ceiling
using an FRF based on past behavior (Option 1).
This is because the fiscal response is not constrained
by any operational rule.
 • If the fiscal framework includes at least one oper-
ational rule, the FRF should, in principle, behave
according to this rule. In practice, this would create
some circularity: the calibration of the debt rule
would depend on the choice of the operational rule
and, conversely, a given debt ceiling would translate
into a specific target for the operational rule. To
avoid this circularity, a simple and practical solution
is to use a normative FRF that departs from the
country’s historical behavior and ensures that the
policy response is “well behaved” and consistent
with debt sustainability (Option 2). The fiscal
reaction function is normative in the sense that it
ensures that debt would converge to a long-term
target level in absence of further shocks.
 • A third option is to set an ad hoc path for the
primary balance path over the projection period
(Option 3).
Option 1. Estimated FRF Based on Past Behavior
The FRF applicable for either an advanced or 
emerging market economy is based on the specifica-
tion of Bohn (1998). Other research on fiscal reaction 
functions in advanced or emerging market economies 
includes Abiad and Ostry (2005), Celasun and Kang 
(2006), and IMF (2003b).
The coefficients of the FRF are estimated economet-
rically to capture historical fiscal behavior. Econo-
metric estimation is carried out using separate panels 
for advanced or emerging market economies, so that 
the estimated FRF coefficients differ among income 
groups. The specification to be estimated is
pbit 5 i 1 1pbit21 1 2ygapitDit 
1 3ygapit(1 2 Dit) 1 ρdit21 1 �it (3.1)
where  pb it is the primary balance (as a ratio of GDP) 
of country i in year t,  d it is debt (as a ratio of GDP),  
ygap it is the output gap,  D it is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 when the output gap is positive, 
α i is the country-specific intercept term (fixed effect), 
and  ε it is a random error term,  ε it ∼ N (0,  σ 2 ) . The 
FRF allows for an asymmetric response to the output 
gap, so that the primary balance may deteriorate more 
when the output gap is negative than it improves 
when the gap is positive  ( β 3 >  β 2 ) . The output gap is
projected over the forecast horizon using GDP growth 
forecasts obtained from simulations (based on the joint 
distribution of macroeconomic variables) combined 
with an Hodrick-Prescott filter to estimate potential 
output.
A less standard FRF can be used to capture 
fiscal behavior in low-income countries. Econo-
metric evidence suggests that the primary bal-
ance may not react to public debt and the output 
gap in low-income countries (Baum and others 
2017). Terms of trade movements are important 
for commodity-exporting countries that rely on 
commodity-based revenue. Disbursements of external 
financing can be treated as exogenous determinants 
of the primary balance, which tends to fluctuate with 
the availability of project-linked external financing 
and budget support. Thus,
pbit 5 i 1 1pbit21 1 2totgapit D it 
c
 1
3totgapit(1 2  D it 
c
 ) 1 4extdisit 1 �it (3.2)
where  totgap it is the deviation of terms of trade from 
trend,  D it C is an indicator variable for commodity 
exporters, and  extdis it are disbursements of external 
public debt (as a ratio of GDP). When using this FRF, 
terms of trade and disbursements of external financ-
ing are included in the joint distribution of macro-
economic variables. Simulations based on this joint 
distribution are used to project the terms of trade gap 
and external financing disbursements.
Each type of FRF includes a fiscal shock real-
ized each period. The distribution of fiscal shocks is 
calibrated on the basis of the estimated residuals of 
the FRF; these residuals correspond to the deviations 
between actual fiscal responses observed (that is, actual 
levels of the primary balance) and the fiscal response 
predicted by the FRF in the sample.
Option 2. Normative FRF
The normative FRF captures the fiscal behavior 
necessary to stabilize debt at a long-term target level 
after shocks dissipate. The specification is the same 
as equation (3.1) above, and parameters are esti-
mated econometrically using panel data, except for  ρ. 
This parameter is calibrated to ensure that debt will 
converge to a long-term target level  d * in the absence 
Box 3. Specifying the Fiscal Reaction Function
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shocks.11 Changing the starting debt level would shift 
and tilt the entire fan chart. The tolerated probability 
of breaching the debt limit can be chosen based on 
11The stochastic simulations are based on symmetric laws and 
draw both positive and negative shocks, but only negative shocks 
matter for the calibration method. Indeed, the debt ceiling is cali-
brated so that debt remains below the maximum debt limit, except 
in a small percentage of cases when particularly bad combinations of 
shocks are realized.
the level of risk a government is willing to accept. A 
probability of 10 percent is used as a baseline. Figure 4 
shows an example of a debt ceiling calibration over a 
six-year horizon, with a safety margin below the max-
imum debt limit. If the current debt level is above the 
debt ceiling, then the country is not maintaining a suf-
ficient safety margin given the degree of risk tolerance. 
The debt ceiling and the size of the safety margin will 
of further shocks. The long-term target should be a 
sustainable level of debt that is politically acceptable 
in the country-specific context. For advanced and 
emerging market economies, one option is to set the 
long-term target level at 60 percent of GDP. The 
appropriate setting for  ρ is the value consistent with 
a steady state of the system of simultaneous equa-
tions formed by the debt accumulation equation and 
fiscal reaction function (3.1) when debt is set equal 
to its long-term target level  d * , with growth  g and the 
real interest rate on government debt  r set to their 
long-term steady state values. Algebraically, the appro-
priate value of  ρ can be expressed as
 5 (1 2 1)  (  
r 2 g
 ____
1 1 g
 ) 2  
i__
d*
 (3.3)
The long-term steady state values for growth and 
the real interest rate can be proxied by imposing 
steady state on an estimated VAR model of the type 
described in Box 2 (that is, imposing that lagged 
values of variables must equal current values) and then 
solving for the vector of steady state values in terms of 
the estimated VAR coefficients. The econometric files 
accompanying this note compute these steady state 
values automatically. If the interest-growth differential 
is low and the long-term debt target  d * is close to the 
current level of debt, it is possible that the value of  ρ 
computed using the formula takes on a smaller (posi-
tive) value than in the estimated FRF from option 1. 
In this case, debt will converge to the long-term target 
(in the absence of shocks) even if fiscal policy is less 
responsive to debt than it has been in the past.
Option 3. Ad Hoc Primary Balance Path
It is also possible for the user to impose a mean 
value for the primary balance in each period over the 
medium-term horizon. This may correspond to the 
user’s baseline forecast (for instance, based on IMF 
World Economic Outlook projections). A fiscal shock 
can be added to this mean value each period to cap-
ture uncertainty about future fiscal behavior.
Box 3. Specifying the Fiscal Reaction Function (continued)
2016 17 18 19 20 21 22
Debt rule ceiling
Safety
margin
Maximum debt limit Risk tolerance
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Source: IMF Sta  Calculations.
Note: Debt is projected over a six-year horizon from 2017-2022. e last year before projections begin is 2016.
20
Figure 4. Method 1: Public Debt Fan Chart
(Percent of GDP)
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be sensitive to a number of key parameters. For exam-
ple, the safety margin will be larger if: (1) the level 
of risk aversion12 increases (as debt must be lower to 
reduce the probability of breaching the limit); (2) the 
amount of macroeconomic volatility implied by the 
estimated joint distribution increases (because larger 
shocks can generate larger increases in debt, a larger 
safety margin is required); (3) the response of the 
primary balance to changes in debt becomes weaker, 
as reflected in the parameters of the FRF (a larger 
safety margin is required when the government is not 
acting strongly enough to offset the impact on debt of 
negative shocks); or (4) the length of the medium-term 
projection horizon increases (over a longer horizon, a 
larger margin is required to ensure with high probabil-
ity that debt remains below the limit, as there is greater 
uncertainty about outcomes farther into the future). 
An important question is how to deal with contin-
gent liabilities, which can be significant and relatively 
frequently realized (Bova and others 2016). In the 
methodology presented above, debt projections will 
likely reflect “normal” contingent liability realizations 
through two channels:
 • Above-the-line contingent liabilities. The FRF
includes the impact of fiscal shocks. These shocks,
which are drawn from their historical distribution,
are affected by the materialization of past contingent
liabilities, provided they were recorded above the
line (generally, under transfers) and transmitted to
the primary balance.
 • Below-the-line contingent liabilities. The debt accu-
mulation equation includes stock-flow adjustments,
which are simulated over the forecast horizon using
their historical distribution in the codes accompany-
ing this note. Thus, debt simulations will reflect the
historical pattern of the realization of contingent lia-
bilities, provided they were recorded below the line.
If the researcher expects contingent liabilities—
either above or below the line—to be larger than those 
experienced historically, this information could be 
captured by manually adjusting the stock-flow adjust-
ments in the debt accumulation equation (see manuals 
attached to this note).
12In this simple framework, a higher degree of risk aversion is 
equivalent to a smaller required probability of debt breaching the 
maximum limit following negative shocks (for instance, a threshold 
of 5 percent or 1 percent rather than 10 percent).
Method Two: Calibrating the Debt Rule Ceiling When the 
Maximum Debt Limit Is Unknown
The second method calibrates the debt ceiling in 
cases in which the maximum debt limit is unknown. 
This method is most suitable for advanced economies 
with unconstrained market access, where considerable 
uncertainty might exist about how much debt can be 
sustained.13
At the core of this method is the assumption that 
the primary balance is bounded upward. A primary 
surplus above a certain bound may be unachievable 
for various reasons, including political and public 
resistance to spending cuts or the fact that additional 
revenue-raising measures eventually become ineffective 
(the peak of the Laffer curve has been passed). Given 
that countries cannot promise to do whatever it takes 
to ensure debt sustainability under all circumstances, 
there is necessarily a level of public debt, above which 
debt stabilization becomes “impossible.”
The method is implemented in three steps. First, 
the maximum feasible primary balance is identified. 
Second, stochastic simulations are used to obtain 
multiple trajectories of macroeconomic variables, the 
primary balance, and debt, using an FRF that describes 
fiscal behavior in response to debt (see the options in 
Box 3). Finally, the debt rule ceiling is identified as the 
initial value of debt, to ensure with high probability 
that debt can be stabilized following negative shocks 
without breaching the maximum feasible primary 
balance.14 The following paragraphs describe the three 
steps in greater detail.
Step 1: Setting the Maximum Primary Balance
The first step is to identify the maximum fea-
sible primary balance.15 The calibration can be 
13This method was developed by an IMF staff team that included 
X. Debrun, M. Jarmuzek, C. Lonkeng, S. Basu, N. End, W. Shi, J.
Sin, and F. Toscani.
14Caution should be applied when using Method Two with an 
estimated (rather than normative) fiscal reaction function. If the esti-
mated reaction function is explosive (reflecting undisciplined fiscal 
behavior in the past), the initial debt level, computed with Method 
Two, cannot be considered safe, given that it would place debt on an 
unsustainable path. In this case, the normative or calibrated reaction 
function should be used.
15In this method, it is possible to back out the debt level con-
sistent with the maximum feasible primary balance, but this debt 
level is not an absolute upper limit for debt as in Method One. It is 
the highest debt level that can be stabilized without breaching the 
maximum feasible primary balance given current macroeconomic 
conditions. If the interest-growth differential increases, the maximum 
debt mechanically declines.
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country-specific or it can be based on cross-country 
historical experience of the largest primary balances 
countries have been able to achieve over certain peri-
ods. For advanced economies, it is possible to assume a 
maximum feasible primary surplus of about 4 percent 
of GDP; for emerging markets, a surplus of 2 per-
cent of GDP could be appropriate (see Escolano and 
others 2014).
Tailoring the choice of maximum feasible primary 
balance to a particular country should be based 
on considerations of what primary balances can be 
sustained over a number of years in the prevailing 
macroeconomic circumstances. IMF (2013c) finds 
that large primary surpluses may be easier to achieve 
than to maintain. The median primary surplus 
achieved in a sample of 43 advanced and emerg-
ing market economies since 1950 was found to be 
lower when it was measured using five-year moving 
averages than using primary balances in individual 
years. There is also evidence that primary surpluses 
are harder to achieve when growth performance is 
below trend.
Step 2: Estimating the Effect of Shocks on the 
Primary Balance and Debt
The second step is to use stochastic simulations to 
determine trajectories of the primary balance and debt 
when shocks occur. In the files attached to this note, 
an estimated VAR (subject to shocks) is used to fore-
cast multiple trajectories of macroeconomic variables 
over a medium-term projection horizon, similar to 
Method One. The corresponding trajectories of the 
primary balance and debt are computed using the 
system of simultaneous equations formed by the debt 
accumulation equation (that is, government budget 
constraint) and a fiscal reaction function (see Box 3 
on the choice of an FRF). The potential trajectories 
for the primary balance and debt under shocks can be 
summarized using separate fan charts.
Step 3: Calibrating the Debt Ceiling
The final step calibrates the debt rule ceiling (initial 
debt level) that ensures with high probability that the 
maximum feasible primary balance is not breached 
over the medium term, even when negative shocks 
occur. Because the limit is on the primary balance 
and the fiscal rule is on debt, the two charts must be 
considered concurrently (Figure 5). The procedure is 
iterative: it starts with a certain level of debt in the first 
year and computes the corresponding debt trajectories 
under various shocks. If the primary balances required 
to stabilize debt breach the maximum feasible primary 
balance in a large number of these debt trajectories 
(say, more than 5 percent or 10 percent), the initial 
debt level is lowered and the exercise is repeated until 
most of the primary balance fan chart falls below the 
feasible maximum over the projection horizon. 
The chosen debt rule ceiling will be sensitive to a 
number of key parameters. A lower debt ceiling will 
be required when there is higher risk aversion, because 
Source: IMF Sta Calculations
Note: e simulations are based on a normative scal reaction function. e primary balance and debt are projected over 
a six-year horizon from 2017-2022. e last year before projections begin is 2016.
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lower debt reduces the probability of exceeding the 
maximum primary balance. A lower debt ceiling will 
also be implied by higher macroeconomic volatility, 
since the primary balance would need to be higher to 
stabilize debt when negative shocks are larger. Finally, 
a lower long-term target level of debt may require a 
lower debt ceiling, in cases where the normative fiscal 
reaction function is used (see Box 3). The normative 
FRF will embody a stronger response of the primary 
balance to the current level of debt when the long-term 
target is lower; so maintaining a lower debt ceiling 
will help keep the required primary balances below the 
maximum feasible.
Limitations of the Proposed Approach
The tools proposed in this note do not substitute for 
the use of full-fledged macroeconomic models that can 
better capture structural and nonlinear relationships 
among variables. This framework for calibrating the 
debt ceiling is made tractable by several simplifying 
assumptions:16
 • Macroeconomic variables are projected using a
simple VAR econometric model subject to shocks
(drawn from a symmetric joint normal/Student’s t
distribution) or by drawing directly from the joint
distribution if quarterly data are unavailable. Thus,
the macroeconomic simulations are informed by his-
torical data and cannot capture the impact of recent
or expected structural changes in the economy.
 • Structural/behavioral equations from economic
theory (for example, aggregate demand curve or
monetary policy rule) are not used to project mac-
roeconomic variables, potentially missing valuable
information on how the economy would behave
in the future.
 • A VAR econometric model has a simple linear
structure. This structure may fail to capture non-
linearities among macroeconomic variables, such as
changes in the relationship between interest rates
and growth throughout the business cycle.
 • The VAR and the joint normal/Student’s t distri-
bution are based on the assumption that macro-
economic shocks are symmetric. In reality, shocks
16In the econometric files accompanying this note, users can make 
ad hoc adjustments to forecasts of macroeconomic variables and 
the primary balance to incorporate country-specific knowledge and 
judgment, which may help overcome some of the limitations. See 
Boxes 2 and 3 for more information.
may be skewed in the adverse direction. Also, the 
distribution of the shocks may not capture tail 
events well.
 • Data constraints may prevent precise estimation
of the VAR or calibration of the joint distribution,
if only short time series for the relevant variables
are available.
 • The fiscal reaction function used to project fiscal
variables contains only a small set of independent
variables and ignores potential nonlinearities and
breaks in the reaction of fiscal policy to debt.
 • Fiscal variables (for example, the primary balance
or debt) are not included in the VAR or the joint
distribution, meaning that there is no feedback from
fiscal policy changes to macroeconomic variables, in
particular GDP.
Another important limitation is that the calibration
methods presented above rely exclusively on the need 
to protect a country’s fiscal position against negative 
shocks. Maintaining prudent debt levels is crucial to 
guarantee fiscal sustainability, but this is not the only 
criterion that can or should be taken into account 
when setting a debt target. In many countries, increas-
ing public investment and funding education and 
health care are also priorities, and at least part of these 
expenditures must be financed through public debt.17
Therefore, there is an inherent trade-off when 
deciding on the level of the debt ceiling. Higher debt 
increases vulnerability to shocks and can undermine 
market confidence and lead to fiscal distress. But the 
debt ceiling should not be too low, to allow space for 
financing development needs. More complex models 
are needed to reflect the trade-off between risk man-
agement and development perspectives. By ignoring 
this trade-off, the methods proposed in this note may 
be biased toward austerity, at least for some emerging 
and developing economies.
17Economic theory suggests that public investment should be 
primarily financed by debt issuance rather than taxes (Ostry, Ghosh, 
and Espinoza 2015). One reason is that the distortions brought 
by taxation are smaller when tax increases are smoothed over time 
through debt finance. In addition, public investment projects are 
expected to generate gains over several years and to benefit future 
generations; therefore, their full cost should not be borne only by 
current taxpayers.
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Framework for Commodity Exporters
In the methods presented above, the fiscal rule asso-
ciated with the final objective of fiscal policy (that is, 
debt sustainability) is the gross debt rule. But net debt 
(debt minus financial assets) may be a more relevant 
anchor in countries with large financial assets. For 
instance, in resource-rich countries it is common to 
focus on net wealth, measured as net financial wealth 
(financial assets minus debt) plus resource wealth—the 
present value of future resource revenues (Baunsgaard 
and others, 2012). The calibration of the net wealth 
(or net financial wealth) target can be based on one of 
the two following approaches:
Long-Term Sustainability Approach
An important challenge is to decide how to allo-
cate net wealth across generations, given that natural 
resources are exhaustible. Various models have been 
developed to calibrate the appropriate level of net 
wealth in resource-rich countries, assuming the need to 
achieve fiscal sustainability and intergenerational equity 
(see a review in IMF 2012).
 • Fixed net wealth benchmark. In the standard model 
of the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH), 
intergenerational equity is achieved by preserving 
government net wealth at its initial level, so that 
future generations will enjoy a similar amount of 
wealth as the current generation. Several variations 
of this model exist, depending on whether net 
wealth is preserved in real terms, real terms per 
capita, or as a share of GDP. The general idea is 
that if only a fraction of resource revenues is spent 
every period, financial savings will increase suffi-
ciently to make up for the depletion of resource 
wealth. Total net wealth is therefore kept constant, 
although its composition changes over time: the 
share of resource wealth (present value of future 
resource revenues) will decline over time, but this 
decline will be perfectly offset by an increase in net 
financial wealth.
 • Variable net wealth path to accommodate higher 
investment. Alternative models, also based on the 
intertemporal budget constraint, relax the assump-
tion of constant net wealth. Extensions of the PIH 
model allow for a temporary scaling-up of public 
investment. Net wealth initially declines during 
the scaling-up period, because saving is lower than 
under the PIH and the stock of financial assets does 
not increase quickly enough to offset the decline 
in resource wealth. These models formalize the 
trade-off faced by commodity producers between 
investing resource revenues in real or financial assets. 
A higher targeted stock of real assets is likely to 
come at the expense of a lower stock of net finan-
cial assets. Models with fiscal multipliers somehow 
mitigate this trade-off, because higher public invest-
ment generates higher financial savings through its 
positive impact on GDP growth and nonresource 
revenues. In these models, a rule on net wealth can 
be introduced only after the scaling-up period of 
investment; that is, once net wealth stabilizes again.
Risk-Based Approach
Uncertainty is another important consideration 
when calibrating net wealth targets in resource-rich 
countries. These countries need larger and more 
durable buffers than other countries because economic 
shocks can be large and highly persistent. The amount 
of the required savings depends on the degree of 
resource dependence, the level of risk the country is 
facing, and its risk tolerance. 
Several methods exist to compute the level of net 
financial wealth that countries should maintain as a 
precautionary buffer—a buffer that can be tapped in 
bad times to support spending when resource revenues 
fall short. For instance, IMF (2012) proposes to use 
a value-at-risk (VaR) approach and a model-based 
approach to estimate the adequacy of buffers. Both 
methods estimate the minimum buffer that can absorb 
tail risks in resource revenue volatility. Specifically, the 
buffer should be set high enough to ensure with high 
probability that it is not fully depleted over the forecast 
horizon and, therefore, expenditure cuts will not be 
needed. Another method was developed in “The Com-
modities Roller Coaster” (IMF 2015): the amount of 
financial savings is calibrated to ensure that investment 
returns on financial assets are sufficient to avoid large 
fiscal adjustment in the event that commodity prices 
fall. To illustrate, IMF (2015) computes, for three 
major oil exporters, the level of financial assets that 
would be sufficient to generate investment returns to 
cover half the lost revenue over five years with 75 per-
cent to 90 percent probability.
From the Debt Rule to the Operational Rules
Debt and deficits are tied through an accounting 
identity. A country’s debt is the cumulative stock of 
past deficit flows, while the (overall) deficit captures 
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the annual change in the country’s debt. In practice, 
currency fluctuations, nondebt financing of deficits, and 
accumulation of financial assets can all temporarily alter 
the one-to-one link between debt and deficits, but in 
general the debt path closely follows that of the deficit. 
In the same way, deficits are inherently tied to govern-
ment spending, with cuts to the deficit often requiring 
cuts to spending. As a result, any target set on the debt 
path implicitly puts constraints on the deficit and, 
ultimately, on spending. Therefore, one needs to ensure 
consistency between the debt rule and the operational 
rules placed on the deficit and spending.
In the methods presented below, the time horizon is 
generally longer than the time horizon used to calibrate 
the debt ceiling in the previous section (which was six 
years by default). Using identical time horizons in both 
exercises would be unwarranted and potentially mislead-
ing. The calibration of the debt ceiling is based on the 
prudence principle that debt dynamics should remain 
under control even if negative shocks occur repeatedly 
over the medium term. It would not be reasonable to 
extend this time horizon beyond five or six years. A 
scenario of repeated negative shocks over the long term 
(say, 20 years) would not only be unrealistic but would 
also certainly result in a safe debt level equal to zero. 
On the contrary, the time horizon used to calibrate the 
operational rules is a policy decision reflecting national 
preferences. The question is whether a government 
wishes to attain the safe debt target asymptotically in the 
long term or over a shorter horizon.
From the Public Debt Ceiling to the Deficit Ceiling18
The derivation of the deficit ceiling from the debt 
ceiling can be done flexibly, depending on the timing 
and sequencing of the desired adjustment path. In 
what follows we will discuss four main approaches, 
each adding a layer of flexibility: (1) a constant balance 
target that guides debt to its ceiling in the long term, 
(2) a constant balance target that guides debt to its 
ceiling by a given date, (3) a constant balance target 
that guides debt to its ceiling by a given date following 
a transition period, and (4) a constant balance target 
that guides debt to its ceiling by a given date, while 
18In countries with exhaustible natural resources, the framework 
would need to be modified to take into account future resource rev-
enues (Baunsgaard and others 2012; IMF 2012). In this context, the 
PIH, Modified PIH, and Fiscal Sustainability Frameworks provide 
benchmarks to calibrate the threshold of fiscal balance rule and, indi-
rectly, estimates of the sustainable level of expenditure.
creating space for long-term increases in age-related 
government spending.
Approach 1: Convergence in the Long Term
This approach derives the constant fiscal balance19 
that, if maintained, would lead to a gradual con-
vergence toward the debt target in the long term. 
Equation (1) lays out the basic formula (derived in 
Appendix 2) that could be used for the calibration of 
both the overall balance and the primary balance tar-
gets as a share of GDP ( b * ), for a given debt-to-GDP 
target ( d * ) and parameter  λ :
b* 5 d* (1)
Note that  λ is alternatively equal to  − γ ___ 1 + γ in the case 
of an overall balance target, and  i − γ ___1 + γ in the case of a 
primary balance target, where  γ stands for the nominal 
GDP growth over the long term and  i is the nominal 
interest rate paid on public debt.20
Equation (1) suggests that, for a hypothetical 
country that grows by 5 percent in nominal terms and 
pays 3 percent of nominal interest rate on its debt over 
the long term, a 60 percent of GDP debt target would 
imply an overall deficit target of about 2.9 percent of 
GDP (as shown in Figure 6) or a primary deficit target 
of about 1.1 percent of GDP.
This is the standard approach to calibrating the 
budget balance rule from a given debt target. It has, 
for example, largely inspired the calibration of the 
European Union’s framework of fiscal rules. Depending 
on the debt target and the initial fiscal balance, this 
formula can entail either an instantaneous consoli-
dation or expansion of the fiscal position. A positive 
feature of this approach is that it is simple and compels 
an immediate adjustment of fiscal policy toward the 
debt target. On the downside, convergence to the debt 
target can be very slow. For example, it would take 
about 15 years for our hypothetical country’s debt to 
complete half the distance from an initial debt ratio of 
70 percent to a target of 60 percent. In addition, this 
approach relies on the simplifying assumption that  λ is 
19In the rest of this section, the formulas are based on fiscal bal-
ances. The results should be interpreted as a deficit ceiling or a deficit 
target when the balance is negative.
20Growth and interest rates could be replaced by their real-term 
values when deriving  λ in equation (1), under the simplifying 
assumptions that nominal interest rates and nominal GDP are 
deflated with a similar deflator and that there is no difference 
between actual and expected inflation. Note that the derivations 
implicitly assume that either the share of foreign currency debt is 
low, or the effective exchange rate is largely stable over the long term.
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constant over the long term; in reality, growth and the 
interest–growth rate differential vary with the level of 
public debt (IMF 2010, 2013c).
The balance target derived in this approach is also 
known as the “debt stabilizing fiscal balance,” which, in 
the case of the primary balance, is somewhat of a mis-
nomer. Indeed, constant primary balance rules imply 
explosive debt paths (that is, diverging to +/-∞), except 
when (1) GDP grows faster than the interest rate paid 
on debt or (2) the starting debt level is already at the 
target  d 0 = d * (Escolano 2010). Consider the case 
in which growth is below the interest rate and the 
initial debt ratio is above the target. In this case, the 
increase in nominal debt (owing to the financing of 
interest payments) would be larger than the increase in 
nominal GDP. This would raise the debt-to-GDP ratio 
indefinitely, as the primary balance is kept constant at 
the target ratio and does not adjust to offset the rising 
debt service. In contrast, a constant overall balance 
rule would place the debt on a convergent path: if the 
overall balance is set at the constant level  b * , the debt 
ratio will asymptotically converge to  d * from any initial 
debt level (under the assumption that nominal growth  
γ is positive).
Approach 2: Convergence by a Given Date
This approach is similar to the first one, except that 
the balance rule ( b * ) is calibrated so that the debt ratio 
hits its target ( d * ) after  N years. Equation (2) below 
lays out the basic formula in this approach given the 
initial level of debt  d 0 ,  λ ,  N , and  d * (see Appendix 2 
for details).
b* 5   __________ 
(1 1 )N 2 1
 [d0 (1 1 )N 2 d*] (2)
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Note that  λ is equal to  − γ ___ 1 + γ in the case of an overall 
balance target and  i − γ ___1 + γ in the case of a primary bal-
ance target, as before.
This approach would be recommended, for exam-
ple, for countries looking to operationalize multiyear 
government plans that set specific fiscal targets to be 
achieved by a given date. Its main appeal resides in the 
fact that it forces convergence to be as quick as desired. 
As a result, it usually requires a larger fiscal effort 
relative to the previous approach. For example, to 
ensure that our hypothetical country in Figure 6 hits 
the 60 percent target within a 15-year span starting 
from an initial debt of 70 percent of GDP, one would 
need to maintain an overall deficit of 2.4 percent or a 
primary deficit of 0.6 percent of GDP (versus 2.9 per-
cent and 1.1 percent, respectively, in the previous 
approach).21 
Approach 3: Convergence by a Given Date Following 
a Transition Period
The two previous approaches implicitly assume an 
instantaneous adjustment of the fiscal balance to its 
target; but in some cases this would imply an overly 
strong contraction or expansion of fiscal policy, making 
the move economically and politically difficult. This 
third approach adds another layer of flexibility by 
allowing for an initial transition period in which the 
balance gradually converges to its target (through a 
gradual consolidation or expansion, depending on its 
starting level). In this approach, we assume that the 
number of years of the transition period is exogenously 
given (equal to  T ).
Equation (3) illustrates a special case in which the 
balance is adjusted annually by a constant amount  
α until it reaches the target  b T *  after  T years. If  b T * is 
maintained afterward, this will ensure convergence to 
the debt target by the end of year  N ( N ≥ T ).22 In 
this case, the path for the balance ratio would be
bt 5 
   t 1 b0, when 0 , t , T   T 1 b0 5 b *   T , when T  t  N
 
 
 (3)
21Note however that, in this approach, the derived balance 
target will need to be adjusted to the debt-stabilizing balance after 
the debt ratio reaches its target. Otherwise, the debt ratio would 
keep diverging.
22A linear adjustment schedule is not crucial to the outcome; what 
matters is the total adjustment  αT at the end of year T that brings 
the balance to the target.
Equation (4) depicts the main calibration for-
mula, which includes an additional term  A compared 
with the “instantaneous adjustment” in the second 
approach (see Appendix 2 for details). This additional 
term captures the effect on the balance of delaying 
the adjustment: to hit the debt target by a given year, 
a higher balance is needed after the transition period 
when there is gradual rather than instantaneous fis-
cal tightening.
b *  T 5  

 __________ 
(1 1 )N 2 1
 [d0 (1 1 )N 2 d * 
 
N
1 A(T, b0, N, , d0, d * 
 
N)] (4)
Note that  λ is alternatively equal to  − γ ___ 1 + γ in the case 
of an overall balance target, and  i − γ ___1 + γ in the case of a 
primary balance target, as before.
Figure 6 illustrates the overall balance and debt 
paths in this approach based on the hypothetical coun-
try case discussed above. It is assumed that the tran-
sition period for the balance ratio is  T = 5 years and 
the convergence horizon for the debt ratio is  N = 15 
years, as in the second approach. In contrast to the 
“instantaneous adjustment” scenario in the second 
approach, the adjustment is backloaded, with initially 
higher deficits and debt followed by much tighter 
policies to hit the debt target within the same horizon. 
This method could, for instance, be used to calibrate 
convergence criteria for countries that are willing to 
join a monetary union by a certain date, as was the 
case at the inception of the euro area. It can also be 
used to calibrate country-specific fiscal adjustment 
programs. It allows more flexibility in the transition to 
the balance target, while still forcing the convergence 
to the debt target to be as quick as desired. But that 
flexibility comes at the cost of sustaining a higher 
fiscal position after the transition period (captured by 
the term  A ).
Approach 4: Convergence by a Given Date Following 
the Buildup of Fiscal Buffers
This approach offers another layer of flexibility in 
the calibration of the balance rule by allowing for a 
balance path that accommodates expected increases 
in future spending. It is recommended for countries 
facing the prospect of aging costs but could also be 
suitable with regard to other long-term costs, such 
as those related to the environment. In an economy 
with an aging population, targeting the constant fiscal 
balance derived in the second approach (equation 2) 
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would become more and more difficult over time, 
as age-related budgetary spending rises, gradually 
crowding out non-age-related spending. Therefore, 
fiscal effort should be frontloaded to build up buffers 
that will be used to absorb future spending pressures 
and help smooth the burden of adjustment over time. 
In a sense, this is the opposite problem of the third 
approach with back-loaded adjustment, in that com-
pliance with the balance rule is relatively easier in the 
short-to-medium term but would become markedly 
harder in the long term.
For simplicity, we separate two time horizons in our 
simulations. In the short-to-medium term, age-related 
costs are assumed to be stable, so the government 
can target a fixed balance without difficulty. In the 
long term, the ratio of age-related spending to GDP 
increases, which translates into a steady deterioration 
of the fiscal balance. Importantly, the simulation 
assumes unchanged policies, meaning that, in the long 
term, the fiscal balance excluding additional age-related 
spending (relative to the initial level) is constant. If this 
balance  b * is held constant, the debt ratio would con-
verge toward its target by the end of year  N , even after 
accounting for higher age-related costs.23
Equation (5) illustrates the balance path of an 
economy in which age-related costs are projected to 
increase after  P years ( P < N ).
bt 5 
   b*, when 0 , t , P   b* 2 At, when P  t  N  
(5)
where  ∆ A t =  A t −  A 0 denotes the incremental aging 
costs in a given year, meaning the difference between 
total age-related costs  A t relative to their size in the 
initial period  A 0 =  A P−1 . 24
Equation (6) shows the main formula deriving the 
constant fiscal balance in this approach using similar 
notations as above, given  d 0 ,  λ ,  N ,  d N * , and  ∆ A t (see 
Appendix 2 for details). Note that equation (6) is an 
adaptation of the long-term adjustment need formula 
of the European Commission, also known as the “S2 
indicator” (European Commission 2015).
23Age-related spending (especially pension expenditures) is largely 
predefined on the basis of pension parameters and demographics, 
and is not tied closely to economic activity. Thus, it can be projected 
more reliably.
24Note that bt = b* 2 ∆At, throughout the whole period N; how-
ever, since ∆At = 0 until year P 2 1(A0 = AP 2 1), we can set bt = b* 
before year P.
b* 5   __________ 
 (1 1 )N 2 1
 [d0 (1 1 )N 2 d * 
 
N 1 S ] (6)
where  S =  ∑ t=1 N  (1 + λ) N−t ∆  A t denotes the value in 
year  N of cumulative future increases in long-term 
age-related spending through  N .25 The constant bal-
ance, excluding incremental aging costs,  b * , includes an 
extra term  S (∆ A t ) compared with the “instantaneous
adjustment” formula (equation 2), which captures 
the additional and upfront adjustment to prepare for 
future increases in age-related spending. As before,  λ 
is equal to  − γ ___ 1 + γ in the case of an overall balance target
and  i − γ ___1 + γ in the case of a primary balance target.
Figure 6 illustrates the overall deficit and debt paths 
in this approach, under the simplifying assumption 
that long-term age-related costs are defined as  
 A t = δ ( t + 1 − P ) +  A 0 for  t ≥ P , implying that these 
costs increase linearly by  δ over time starting from 
year  P = 6 .26 All other parameters are kept the same 
as before. In the early years, the country runs lower 
deficits than would be needed absent long-term aging 
costs (that is, relative to the “convergence by a given 
date” scenario), effectively building up fiscal buffers. 
But as age-related costs increase beginning in the sixth 
year, the fiscal balance path progressively deteriorates 
to accommodate these costs. Still, the debt ratio hits its 
target by the end of the period  N . In the scenario pre-
sented in Figure 6, the debt ratio declines below target 
in the later years to accommodate future increases in 
deficits that will bring debt back to target by the end 
of the forecast horizon. Note that this approach is usu-
ally suited to a much longer term perspective (decades) 
than the ones discussed above. We have used the same 
time horizon in Figure 6 ( N = 15 years) for ease of 
comparison across approaches.
A broadly similar approach is also used to calibrate 
the Medium-Term Objectives (MTO) of the Euro-
pean fiscal framework (European Commission 2016). 
In particular, the MTO formula includes a term that 
covers a fraction of the present value of the projected 
increase in age-related expenditure.
25Accordingly, the present discounted value of  S would be 
S / (1 + λ) N =  ∑ t=1 N  (1 + λ) −t ∆  A t .
26In the simulation,  δ is set at about 0.2 percent of GDP per 
year starting in year  P = 6 , so the total increase in age-related 
spending would be 2 percent of GDP until year  N = 15 (within 
a 10-year horizon), which corresponds to the average increase in 
pension and health care spending in advanced and emerging market 
economies. Thus, in present value terms, the cumulative increase 
in age-related spending through year  N would be  S / (1 + λ) N = 22 
percent of GDP.
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From the Structural Deficit Ceiling to the Nominal 
Deficit Ceiling
The previous formulas are used to ensure that the 
debt and balance rules are consistent in the long term; 
that is, when nominal aggregates are equal to their 
steady-state structural values. It is thus reasonable to 
assume that these formulas calibrate the structural 
balance rule.27
It can be useful to derive from the structural balance 
rule a corresponding threshold for the nominal balance 
rule. This is particularly important in countries that 
have both nominal and structural balance rules, to 
minimize the risk of conflict between them. For a 
given structural balance target, the nominal deficit 
ceiling should be sufficiently high to allow automatic 
stabilizers to fully operate during a typical economic 
downturn (this means that the nominal deficit should 
be allowed to increase in response to the cyclical 
decline in revenues). But the nominal deficit ceiling 
should not be so high that it permits discretionary fis-
cal expansions that are inconsistent with the structural 
balance ceiling.
Equation (7) details how to compute a constant 
nominal balance target,  nb * , for a given structural bal-
ance target,  sb * (See Appendix 2 for its derivation).
nb* 5 sb* 2 OGmax[r(1 2 ) 2 e(1 2 )] (7)
where  OG max stands for the maximum output gap 
during a typical downturn (it is a negative number);  r 
and  η are, respectively, the revenue ratio and its elas-
ticity relative to output; and  e and  κ are, respectively, 
the spending ratio and its elasticity relative to output.
Estimates of revenue and spending elasticities gen-
erally yield values close to 1 and 0, respectively; hence 
the following is a common proxy for the link between 
structural and nominal balances:
nb* 5 sb* 1 OGmaxe (8)
The structural balance target  sb * is expressed as a 
ratio to potential output while the nominal balance 
target  nb * is expressed as a ratio to current output 
27In principle, the deficit ceilings derived from the various 
approaches discussed here could be applied to either the nominal 
balance or the structural balance. When applied to the structural bal-
ance, the budget balance ceiling is binding on average over the cycle 
(although the nominal balance can deviate and fluctuate with the 
cycle). When applied to the nominal balance, however, the ceiling is 
constantly binding and must be enforced every year. This means that 
the fiscal deficit consistent with the debt target is more demanding 
when the formulas are applied to the nominal balance than to the 
structural balance.
(see Fedelino and others 2009 and Escolano 2010 
for a detailed discussion). For a government targeting 
a structural deficit of 1 percent of potential GDP, 
spending 40 percent of GDP on average, and facing an 
output gap of –2 percent, equation (8) would imply a 
constant nominal deficit ceiling of 2 percent of GDP.
This formula is, for instance, used to ensure 
consistency between the nominal deficit ceiling and 
the Medium-Term Objective (in structural terms) 
in the European fiscal framework (European Com-
mission 2016).
From the Structural Balance Ceiling to the 
Expenditure Ceiling
The final step in deriving operational rules is the 
calibration of expenditure rules, which can be defined 
in terms of either expenditure growth or an expen-
diture ratio. For simplicity, we assume that there 
is no cyclical component to expenditure, meaning 
that expenditure does not respond automatically to 
economic conditions (as would be the case if there 
were an unemployment benefit scheme, for instance) 
and that automatic stabilizers operate on the revenue 
side only. This is consistent with empirical evidence 
showing that revenues are far more sensitive than 
expenditure to the business cycle (Price, Dang, and 
Guillemette 2014). In this case, there is no difference 
between observed/nominal expenditure and structural 
expenditure. We also assume that the country has a 
given structural tax ratio  r s (computed as the ratio of 
structural revenues to potential GDP), which remains 
constant unless there is a change in tax policy.
Under these assumptions, for a given structural 
balance ratio  sb , the implied expenditure ratio  e s (in 
percentage of potential GDP) is equal to:
e s 5 r s 2 sb
which implies that:
e s 5 r s 2 sb (9)
If there is no tax policy change ( ∆ r s = 0 ) and if the 
country already complies with the structural balance 
rule ( sb =  sb * and ∆ sb = 0), the two equations show 
that the structural balance rule can be interpreted as 
(1) a constant ratio of spending-to-potential GDP  
∆ es = 0 or (2) a rule in which spending growth is 
equal to potential GDP growth. In other words, if the 
country is already at a structural position consistent 
with the structural balance rule, nominal spending 
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should grow at the same pace as nominal potential 
GDP.
For instance, for a country that is collecting 40 per-
cent of potential GDP in revenues and whose poten-
tial GDP is growing in nominal terms by 4 percent 
a year on average, maintaining a structural deficit of 
1 percent of potential GDP would be consistent with 
either (1) an expenditure-ratio ceiling of 41 percent of 
potential GDP or (2) a ceiling of 4 percent applied to 
nominal expenditure growth.
This basic framework can be expanded in two ways:
 • The framework can account for structural 
changes in revenue mobilization ( ∆ r s ≠ 0 in 
equation 9). If a country takes new discretionary 
revenue measures (either revenue enhancing or 
revenue diminishing), the expenditure ceiling 
should be adjusted upward or downward to 
ensure that the structural balance remains at its 
targeted value (sb * ) and that debt remains on its 
targeted path.28 Allowing for this flexibility in 
28Another option is to combine the expenditure rule with a 
debt-break mechanism that forces a correction of the rule for past 
the expenditure rule is key to preserving incen-
tives for taking new revenue-enhancing measures 
as well as to ensuring that the adoption of new 
tax expenditures (or other revenue-decreasing 
measures) does not derail the debt path.
 • The framework can also be adapted to fit transi-
tion periods toward the structural balance target 
if the country does not comply with the rule 
from the start  ( sb ≠  sb * ). In this case, the growth 
of government spending should be temporarily 
maintained below or above trend GDP to guide 
the structural balance toward its target. The size 
of the wedge between spending growth and trend 
growth would have to be calibrated to engineer 
the required change in the structural stance.
Both of these extensions of the framework are 
featured in the “expenditure benchmark” implemented 
in the European Union. European Commission (2016) 
provides more details on the calculations.
deviations from the debt path (see Debrun, Epstein, and Symansky 
2008 for a detailed discussion of the case of Israel).
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Appendix 1. Deriving the Debt Rule Threshold
Method One
This method requires the characterization of the 
joint distribution of the macroeconomic variables 
needed to project the public debt ratio. For advanced 
and emerging market economies, these variables are 
growth, the average interest rate on debt, and the 
exchange rate. For low-income countries, the terms 
of trade and external financing disbursements are 
also required. Characterizing the joint distribution is 
done either by (1) estimating a vector autoregression 
(VAR) or (2) directly calibrating a joint multivariate 
distribution based on historical co-movement between 
variables. A VAR can be used when quarterly data are 
available, so that there are sufficient observations for 
econometric estimation. The direct calibration of a 
joint multivariate distribution may be most appropri-
ate where only annual data are available.
Indirect Estimation with a VAR
If quarterly data are available, an unrestricted VAR 
can be estimated for each country, describing the joint 
dynamics of the macroeconomic variables needed to 
project public debt. The econometric model is
Xt 5 A0 1  
p
 
 
  
j 5 1
Aj Xt 2 j 1 �t
where  X t is the k-dimensional vector of macroeconomic 
variables and  ε t is a k-dimensional vector of normally 
distributed shocks:  ε t ∼ N ( 0, Ω ) .
The estimated variance-covariance matrix of the 
VAR,  Ω ˆ is then used to generate N sequences of
macroeconomic shocks  ε t over the six-year projection 
horizon (N is a large number of simulations; for exam-
ple, more than 1,000). For each of the N simulations 
of shocks, the estimated VAR model is used to forecast 
macroeconomic variables  X t over the six-year projec-
tion horizon, adding the generated shocks to the VAR 
model each year as the error term. Using a VAR to 
make projections is ideal, as the lagged effect of mac-
roeconomic shocks can be taken into account through 
the autoregressive structure of the model.
Direct Calibration of a Multivariate Distribution
As an alternative to VAR estimation, a simpler 
approach can be used if quarterly macroeconomic data 
are not available. A multivariate normal (or Student’s 
t) distribution of key macroeconomic variables can be
calibrated based on historical comovements of mac-
roeconomic variables. N sequences of six-year projec-
tions can be obtained by drawing repeatedly from this 
distribution.
A multivariate normal distribution of a 
k-dimensional vector of macroeconomic variables can
be written as
x  Nk (, )
with the k-dimensional mean vector
 5 (E[X1], E[X2], . . . , E[Xk])
and the  k × k covariance matrix
 5 (cov(Xi, Xj)), for all i 5 1,2, . . . . , k; 
j 5 1,2, . . . , . k
The parameters  μ, Σ can be calibrated based on the 
historical mean, variance, and covariance of macro-
economic variables. Alternatively, the econometric 
programs accompanying this note allow for the use 
of a multivariate Student’s t distribution, which has 
wider tails. (See manuals describing the files for more 
information.)
Calibrating the Debt Ceiling
The debt ceiling is calibrated as follows:
1. A set of macroeconomic variables is forecast over
a six-year projection horizon N times by either (a) 
using the estimated VAR, including shocks each 
period; or alternatively by (b) drawing directly from 
the calibrated multivariate distribution of macroeco-
nomic variables each year.
2. The N sets of macroeconomic variable forecasts
are used to generate N trajectories of the primary
balance, using a fiscal reaction function (FRF)
and the previous year level of debt (see Box 3 in
the text for FRF options). In the econometric
programs accompanying this note, annual changes
in the primary balance implied by the FRF are
constrained (that is, they cannot exceed certain
limits) on the basis of historical experience to
ensure that projected primary balances are realistic.
Fiscal shocks can also be added directly in the
FRF. The distribution of fiscal shocks is calibrated
based on estimated deviations between actual fiscal
responses observed (that is, actual levels of the
primary balance) and the fiscal response predicted
by the FRF within the sample.
3. The N corresponding trajectories of debt (starting
at the current debt level) are obtained by the system
of simultaneous equations formed by the debt accu-
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mulation equation (government budget constraint) 
and the FRF. The debt accumulation equation is
dt 5  ( 1 1  (  
rt 2 gt _____
1 1 gt
 ) ) dt 2 1 2 pbt 1 SFAt
where  d t is debt (as a ratio of GDP),  r t is the aver-
age effective real interest rate on debt,  g t is the real 
GDP growth rate,  pb t is the primary balance (as a 
ratio of GDP) and  SFA t is the stock-flow adjust-
ment (as a ratio of GDP). The debt accumulation 
equation includes a constant stock flow adjustment 
each period that could potentially account for reali-
zation of contingent liabilities.
4. If the 95th debt percentile (or other chosen percen-
tile, given risk tolerance) of the debt ratio distribu-
tion is significantly below the maximum debt limit 
(MDL) in all years of the projection horizon [or is 
significantly above the MDL in at least one year], 
the starting level of debt is increased [decreased] 
by a small amount (0.3 percent), and steps 1–3 are 
repeated based on the new starting level.
Steps 1–4 are repeated until the 95th percentile of 
the debt level falls into a small interval around the 
MDL in at least one year of the medium-term pro-
jection horizon:  Debt 95 ∈  [MDL − 0.4; MDL + 0.4] , 
without significantly breaching the MDL in any year. 
The starting level of debt satisfying this criterion is 
called the debt ceiling; that is, the level of debt from 
which its projection does not exceed the MDL with 
95 percent likelihood over the medium-term projec-
tion horizon. The safety margin is computed as the 
MDL minus the debt ceiling.
The fan charts can also be used to determine the 
probability of breaching the maximum debt limit, 
conditional on any starting level. For example, using 
the current debt level as the starting level, the fan chart 
can be used to determine the probability that debt will 
exceed the debt limit in all years over the projection 
horizon. This can be useful to gauge the extent of risk 
associated with a country’s current debt position.
Method Two
The debt ceiling is calibrated as follows:
1. A set of macroeconomic variables is forecast 
over a six-year projection horizon N times 
using an estimated VAR, including shocks each 
period (the VAR estimation is similar to that in 
Method One).
2. The N sets of forecasts are used to generate N 
trajectories of the primary balance, using either an 
estimated or normative fiscal reaction function (see 
Box 3 in the text).
3. The N corresponding trajectories of debt (starting 
at the current debt level) are obtained by the system 
of simultaneous equations formed by the debt accu-
mulation equation (government budget constraint) 
and the fiscal reaction function (which depends on 
the lagged value of debt).
4. If the 95th percentile of primary balances (or 
other chosen percentile, given risk tolerance) is 
significantly below the maximum feasible primary 
surplus (MFPS) (that, is, falls below the interval  
pb 95 ∈  [MFPS − 0.4; MFPS + 0.4] ) in all years of 
the projection horizon [or is significantly above 
the MFPS in any one year], the starting level of 
debt is increased [decreased] by 0.3 percent, and 
steps 1–3 are repeated based on the new starting 
level. For advanced economies a typical MFPS 
would be about 4 percent of GDP, while for emerg-
ing market economies it would be 2 percent of 
GDP (see Escolano and others 2014).
Steps 1–4 are repeated until the 95th percen-
tile of the primary balance falls into the small 
interval around the MFPS in at least one year 
of the medium-term projection horizon: pb 95 ∈  
[MFPS − 0.4; MFPS + 0.4] , without significantly 
breaching the MFPS in any year. The starting 
level of debt satisfying this criterion is called the 
debt ceiling.
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Appendix 2. Deriving the Operational 
Rule Thresholds
From the Public Debt Ceiling to the Deficit Ceiling
We start with the accounting identity relating the 
gross debt to overall balance (OB) and primary balance 
(PB), also known as the debt dynamics equation:1
Dt 5 Dt 2 1 2 OBt ⇒ dt 5  
1 ______ 
(1 1 t)
dt 2 1 2 obt
Dt 5 (1 1 it) Dt 2 1 2 PBt ⇒ dt 5  
(1 1 it) ______
(1 1 t)
 dt 2 1 
2 pbt
where  D t is the nominal level of debt at the end of 
period  t ,  i t is the effective nominal interest rate paid on 
the inherited debt  D t−1 , and  γ t is the nominal growth 
rate of GDP, with small letters denoting a variable 
as a share of GDP. We can rewrite this debt dynam-
ics equation as
dt 5  ( 1 1   t j ) dt 2 1 2  b  t  j for j  {o,p}
1 1   t 
 j  5  



 1 ______ 
(1 1 t )
,  when  b  t 
 j 5 obt for j 5 o
 
(1 1 it ) ______
(1 1 t )
 ,  when  b  t 
 j 5 pbt for j 5 p
with  b t j denoting the balance ratio in period  t , which 
becomes the overall balance if  j = o and primary 
balance if  j = p together with the corresponding 
growth-adjusted interest rate  λ t o =  
 − γ t  _____  (1 +  γ t ) 
if  j = o and  
λ t p =  
 i t − γ t  _____  (1 +  γ t ) 
if  j = p . In the rest of the appendix, we 
will drop the index  j and derive the relevant equations 
for the balance ratio; one could retrieve the relevant 
equations for the overall and primary balances using 
corresponding  λ t j for  j =  { o, b } :
dt 5 (1 1 t ) dt 2 1 2 bt (A.2.1)
Approach 1: Convergence in the Long Term
Using equation (A.2.1) and assuming  λ t = λ is 
constant in the long term, the constant balance ratio  b * 
compatible with achieving a constant debt ratio  d * in 
the long term would be
b* 5 d* (A.2.2)
Specifically, the constant overall and primary bal-
ance ratios are
1If gross debt becomes negative, it will be interpreted as assets.
ob* 5  
2 _____ 
1 1  d*
and
pb* 5  
i 2 
 _____
1 1 
 d*
Using equation (A.2.2), the instantaneous adjust-
ment to the balance ratio to reach a constant debt ratio 
d * over the long term can be decomposed as
b* 2 b0 5 [d0 2 b0] 2 (d0 2 d*)
where the first term on the right-hand side corresponds 
to the gap to the debt-stabilizing balance ratio (at the 
initial level of debt), and the second term corresponds 
to the additional adjustment due to the debt target  d * 
being (potentially) different from the initial debt ratio  
d 0 .2 While the pace of adjustment is instantaneous in 
this particular example, the convergence to the desired 
debt ratio would be asymptotic.
Approach 2: Convergence by a Given Date
Under the assumption that  λ t is time-varying, equa-
tion (A.2.1) has the following solution
dN 5 d0  
N
 
 
 
t 5 1
(1 1 t ) 2  
N
 
 
   
t 5 1
    
N
 
  
    
i 5 t 1 1
 (1 1 i )  bt
Assuming that  λ t is time-invariant, the solution to 
equation (A.2.1) becomes
dN 5 d0 (1 1 )N 2   t 5 1 
N (1 1 )N 2 t bt (A.2.3)
Given the initial debt level  d 0 , the constant balance 
ratio  b * that achieves a target debt ratio  d N * in  N peri-
ods  N < ∞ can be derived from (A.2.3) as
b* 5  1 _____________ 
  t 5 1 
N (1 1 )N 2 t 
 (d0 (1 1 )N 2  d  N 
* )
which leads to
b* 5   __________ 
 (1 1 )N 2 1
 (d0(1 1 )N 2  d  N 
* ) (A.2.4)
Rearranging equation (A.2.4) to decompose the 
components of adjustment as before, we get
b* 2 b0 5 [d0 2 b0] 1  
d0 2   d  N 
* 
 ____________  
((1 1 )N 2 1)/
 (A.2.5)
Setting  N = 1 in equation (A.2.5), for example, 
would give  b * −  b 0 =  [λ  d 0 −  b 0 ] +  [  d 0 −  d N * ] , where the 
instantaneous adjustment to the balance ratio required 
to bring the debt ratio to  d * in  1 period would be the 
sum of (1) the gap to the debt-stabilizing balance ratio 
(at the initial debt level) and (2) an additional term 
2Note that when  λ < 0 and  d * <  d 0 , the second term is positive, 
implying additional adjustment relative to the adjustment needed to 
stabilize the debt at its initial level. However, if  λ > 0 , the debt path 
becomes unstable, diverging to +  ∞ if  d * <  d 0 and  − ∞ if  d * >  d 0 .
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reflecting the distance between the initial and desired 
debt ratios.
Approach 3: Convergence by a Given Date Following 
a Transition Period
Let the initial balance ratio  b 0 in period  t = 0 be 
gradually adjusted until period  T < N , and achieve 
b T * in period  T , which is the constant balance ratio 
that brings the debt ratio to  d N * by period  N . Assum-
ing a linear adjustment schedule for the balance 
ratio would give
bt 5   
t 1 b0, when 0 , t , T            
T 1 b0 5  b T 
* , when T  t  N
(A.2.6)
with  α denoting the annual adjustment of the fiscal 
balance from period  0 to  T . In this case, equation 
(A.2.3) becomes
dN 5 d0 (1 1 )N 2  
T
 
 
   
t 5 1
(1 1 )N 2 t (t 1 b0) 
2 
N
     
t 5 T 1 1
 (1 1 )N 2 t (T 1 b0)
Rearranging3 to decompose the components of the 
total adjustment  b T * −  b 0 = αT leads to
T 5   
d0 ((1 1 )N 2 1)  _____________
  t 5 1 
N  (1 1 )N 2 t
   2 b0 
1 
   t 5 1 
T  (1 1 )N 2 t(T 2 t)  ___________________ 
  t 5 1 
N (1 1 )N 2 t
  1  
d0 2  d  N 
* 
 _____________  
  t 5 1 
N (1 1 )N 2 t 
which simplifies as
T 5 [d0 2 b0] 1
 
   t 5 1 
T (1 1 )N 2 t (T 2 t)  ___________________ 
((1 1 )N 2 1)/
 
1  
d0 2  d  N 
* ____________  
((1 1 )N 2 1)/
 (A.2.7)
The total adjustment  b T * −  b 0 is therefore given by 
the sum of (I) the gap to the debt-stabilizing balance 
ratio (at the initial debt level), (II) an additional term 
reflecting the need to adjust more when the adjust-
ment is gradual rather than instantaneous, and (III) 
the required extra adjustment due to the distance from 
the debt target. Note that if  T = 1 , equation (A.2.7) 
collapses to equation (A.2.5) with an instantaneous 
adjustment to the constant balance ratio required to 
3On the right-hand side, add and subtract  d 0 and rewrite  
αt = αT − α ( T − t ) . Move  d N to the right-hand side and the terms 
with  αT to the left-hand side. Divide both sides by  ∑ t=1 N  (1 + λ) N−t = 
( (1 + λ) N − 1 ) / λ , simplify, and group as shown.
achieve  d N * , which could be very costly. As  T increases, 
the yearly adjustment  α falls:4
 5 
 ( d0 2 b0 1  d0 2  d  N 
* 
 ____________  
((1 1 )N 2 1)/
 ) 
   ____________________________________  
 ( T 2  T(1 1 )
N 2 T ((1 1 )T 2 1)/ 2   t 5 1 
T  (1 1 )N 2 tt   _____________________________________ 
((1 1 )N 2 1)/
  )
This  α (T,  b 0 , N, λ,  d 0 ,  d N * ) pins down the path for the 
balance ratio as depicted in (A.2.6), and using (A.2.7) 
we would have
b *T 5 T 1 b0 5  

 __________ 
(1 1 )N 2 1
 [d0(1 1 )N 2 d *N
1 A(T, b0, N, , d0, d *N )]
where  A (T,  b 0 , N, λ,  d 0 ,  d N * ) = α  ∑ t=1 T  (1 + λ) N−t (T − t) .
Approach 4: Convergence by a Given Date Following 
a Buildup of Fiscal Buffers
Let  ∆ A t =  A t −  A 0 be the change in age-related 
spending relative to period  t 0 , and  b * be the constant 
balance ratio excluding the incremental change in 
age-related spending  ∆ A t that, if maintained, would 
ensure convergence to the debt target  d N * by the end 
of period  N .5 In other words, the balance ratio fol-
lows this path:
bt 5 b* 2 ∆ At (A.2.8)
In this case, equation (A.2.3) becomes
d *N  5 d0(1 1 )N 2
 
N
 
 
   
t 5 1
(1 1 )N 2 t b* 1 S
with the analytical solution
b* 5   __________ 
(1 1 )N 2 1
 (d0(1 1 )N 2 d *N  1 S ) (A.2.9)
where  S =  ∑ t=1 N  (1 + λ) N−t ∆  A t is the value in year  N of 
the cumulative increase in long-term age-related costs 
through  N . Similar to (A.2.7) we could decompose 
the components of the total adjustment for a given 
sequence of  ∆ A t as
b* 2 b0 5 [d0 2 b0] 1  
d0 2 d *N ____________  
((1 1 )N 2 1/
 
4In equation (A.2.7),  ∑ t=1 T  (1 + λ) N−t t =  (1 + λ) N+1 / λ 2 [1 −  1 + λ (T + 1) _______
 (1 + λ) T+1   ] .5Note that, here we present a general framework in which  A t can 
differ from  A 0 in any given year  t > 0 . In the note, however, we 
presented simulations based on a special case in which  A t  = A 0 until 
year  P − 1 and starts increasing from year  P .
I

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1  S ____________ 
((1 1 )N 2 1)/
 
where (IV) is the additional required upfront adjust-
ment due to costs of an aging population.
Note that if we impose the simplifying assumption 
that age-related costs increase linearly by an annual 
amount  δ starting from year  P ≤ N , i.e.,  A t = δ ( 
t + 1 − P ) +  A 0 for  t ≥ P , the analytical solution for  S 
can be derived as
S 5 (1 1 )(N 1 1 2 (P 2 1))/2  
 1 2   1 1 (N 1 1 2 (P 2 1))  __________________ (1 1 )N 1 1 2 (P 2 1)   
Under the special case in our simulations, in which  
A t  = A 0 until year  P − 1 and starts increasing from year  
P , the balance ratio would remain constant at  b * as 
given by (A.2.9) until year  P − 1 then would gradually 
decline by  ∆ A t starting from year  P as given by (A.2.8).
From the Structural Deficit Ceiling to the Nominal 
Deficit Ceiling
Let  Y and  Y s denote the actual and potential nom-
inal GDP,  R and  R s the levels of actual and structural 
revenues, E and  E s the levels of actual and structural 
expenditures, and  NB = R − E and  SB =  R s −  E s the 
nominal and structural balance. Let  OG =  Y −  Y s  ____ Y s  be 
the output gap, which implies   Y s  __Y =  
1 _____ 1 + OG . Note that 
structural revenues are defined as   R s  __R =  (  Y s  __Y ) η and struc-
tural expenditures as   E s  __E =  (  Y s  __Y ) κ , where  η and  κ are 
the elasticities of revenue and expenditures with respect 
to the output, which measure the relationship between 
the cyclical components of revenues and expenditure 
relative to the cyclical component of output. In this 
case, the structural balance as a ratio of potential GDP 
( sb ) is defined as
sb 5  SB __
Y s
5  R
 s
 __
Y s
2  E
 s
 __
Y s
5  R _ 
Y s
 R
 s
 __
R 
2  E __ 
Y s
 E
 s
 __
E
 5  R __ 
Y s
 (  Y s __Y ) 

 
2  E __ 
Y s
 (  Y s __Y ) 

5  R _________ 
Y/(1 1 OG )
  (   1 ______ 1 1 OG ) 

 2  E _________ 
Y/(1 1 OG )
  (  1 ______ 1 1 OG ) 

 
5  R __ 
Y 
(1 1 OG )1 2  2  E _ 
Y 
(1 1 OG )1 2  (A.2.10)
For a small enough  OG , one can approximate  
( 1 + OG ) 1−x ≈ 1 +  (1 − x) OG for  x =  { η, κ } .
In this case, equation (A.2.10) becomes
sb 5 r (1 1 (1 2 )OG ) 2 e(1 1 (1 2 )OG )
5 (r 2 e) 1 OG[r (1 2 ) 2 e (1 2 )]
5 nb 1 OG[r (1 2 ) 2 e (1 2 )] (A.2.11)
where  r and  e respectively denote revenue and expen-
ditures as a share of GDP, with the nominal fiscal 
balance ( nb ) as a share of GDP given by  nb = r − e .
Using (A.2.11) and taking a medium-term view 
(averages of revenue and expenditure ratios), one 
could derive from a given structural balance target  
sb * a corresponding nominal balance target  nb * (and 
reciprocally) as
nb* 5 sb* 2 OG[r(1 2 ) 2 e (1 2 )]

IV
24
FISCAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT HOW-TO NOTES
International Monetary Fund | December 2017
References
Abiad, A. and J. D. Ostry. 2005. “Primary Surpluses and Sus-
tainable Debt Levels in Emerging Market Countries.” IMF 
Policy Discussion Paper 05/6, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC.
Baum, A., A. Hodge, A. Mineshima, M. Moreno Badia, and 
R. Tapsoba. 2017. “Can They Do It All? Fiscal Space in
Low-Income Countries.” IMF Working Paper 17/110, Inter-
national Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Baunsgaard, T., M. Villafuerte, M. Poplawski-Ribeiro, and C. 
Richmond. 2012. “Fiscal Frameworks for Resource Rich 
Developing Countries.” IMF Staff Discussion Note 12/04, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Bohn, H. 1998. “The Behavior of U.S. Public Debt and Defi-
cits.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87: 949–63.
Bova, E., M. Ruiz-Arranz, F. Toscani, and H. E. Ture. 2016. 
“The Fiscal Costs of Contingent Liabilities: A New Dataset.” 
IMF Working Paper 16/14, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC.
Cecchetti, S. G., M. S. Mohanty, and F. Zampolli. 2011. “The 
Real Effects of Debt.” BIS Working Paper 352, Bank for 
International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland
Celasun, O., X. Debrun, and J. Ostry. 2007. “Primary Surplus 
Behavior and Risks to Fiscal Sustainability in Emerging 
Market Countries: A Fan-Chart Approach.” IMF Staff Papers 
53 (3): 401.
Celasun, O. and J. Shik Kang. 2006. “On the Properties of 
Various Estimators for Fiscal Reaction Functions.” IMF 
Working Paper 06/182, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC.
Cordes, T., T. Kinda, P. Muthoora, and A. Weber. 2015. 
“Expenditure Rules: Effective Tools for Sound Fiscal Policy.” 
IMF Working Paper 15/29, International Monetary Fund 
Washington, DC.
Cottarelli, C., and L. Jaramillo. 2012. “Walking Hand in 
Hand: Fiscal Policy and Growth in Advanced Economies.” 
IMF Working Paper 12/137, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC.
Debrun, X., N. Epstein, and S. Symansky. 2008. “A New Fiscal 
Rule: Should Israel Go Swiss?” IMF Working Paper 08/87, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Debrun, X., M. Jarmuzek, and A. Shabunina. 2017. “Public 
Debt: Not Safe at Any Speed.” Forthcoming, IMF Working 
Paper, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Escolano, J. 2010. A Practical Guide to Debt Dynamics, Fiscal 
Sustainability, and Cyclical Adjustment of Budgetary Aggre-
gates. IMF Technical Notes and Manuals 2010/02 Washington, 
DC: International Monetary Fund.
———, and V. Gaspar. 2016. “Optimal Debt Policy Under 
Asymmetric Risk.” IMF Working Paper 16/178, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Escolano, J., L. Jaramillo, C. Mulas-Granados, and G. Terrier. 
2014. “How Much Is a Lot? Historical Evidence on the Size 
of Fiscal Adjustments.” IMF Working Paper 14/179, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
European Commission (EC). 2015. “Fiscal Sustainability 
Report.” Institutional Paper 18, European Commission, 
Brussels, January.
———. 2016. “Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact” 
European Economy Institutional Paper 021, European Com-
mission, Brussels, March.
Eyraud, L., and T. Wu. 2015. “Playing by the Rules: Reforming 
Fiscal Governance in Europe.” IMF Working Paper 15/67, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Fedelino, A. M. Horton, and A. Ivanova, 2009, “Computing 
Cyclically Adjusted Balances and Automatic Stabilizers,” IMF 
Technical Note and Manuals 09/05.
Ferrucci, G., and A. Penalver. 2003. “Assessing Sovereign Debt 
under Uncertainty.” Financial Stability Review 15: 151–59.
Frankel, J., C. Vegh, and G. Vuletin. 2013. “On Graduation 
from Fiscal Procyclicality.” Journal of Development Econom-
ics 100: 32–47.
Garcia, M. and R. Rigobon. 2004. “A Risk Management 
Approach to Emerging Market’s Sovereign Debt Sustainabil-
ity with an Application to Brazilian Data.” NBER Working 
Paper 10336, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Ghosh, A., J. Kim, E. Mendoza, J. Ostry, and M. Qureshi. 
2013. “Fiscal Fatigue, Fiscal Space and Debt Sustain-
ability in Advanced Economies.” Economic Journal 123 
(566): F4–F30.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2003a. “Sustainability 
Assessments—Review of Application and Methodological 
Refinements.” IMF Policy Paper, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, DC available at https:// www .imf .org/ 
external/ np/ pdr/ sustain/ 2003/ 061003 .htm
———. 2003b. “Public Debt in Emerging Markets: Is It Too 
High?” Chapter III in World Economic Outlook: Public Debt 
in Emerging Markets, World Economic and Financial Surveys. 
Washington, DC, September.
———. 2009. “Fiscal Rules – Anchoring Expectations for 
Sustainable Public Finances,” IMF Policy Paper, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC available at https:// www 
.imf .org/ external/ np/ pp/ eng/ 2009/ 121609 .pdf
———. 2010. Fiscal Monitor: Fiscal Exit, From Strategy to Imple-
mentation, Washington, DC, November.
———. 2012. “Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for 
Resource Rich Developing Countries.” IMF Policy Paper and 
supplements available at https:// www .imf .org/ external/ np/ pp/ 
eng/ 2012/ 082412 .pdf and https:// www .imf .org/ external/ np/ 
pp/ eng/ 2012/ 082412a .pdf and https:// www .imf .org/ external/ 
np/ pp/ eng/ 2012/ 082412b .pdf
———. 2013a. “Staff Guidance Note for Public Debt Sustain-
ability Analysis in Market-Access Countries.” https:// www .imf 
.org/ external/ pubs/ ft/ dsa/ mac .htm
———. 2013b. “Staff Guidance Note on the Application of 
the Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Framework for 
25
 H OW TO C A L I b R AT E F I S C A L R u L E S: A P R I M E R
International Monetary Fund | December 2017
Low-Income Countries.” http:// www .imf .org/ external/ np/ pp/ 
eng/ 2013/ 110513 .pdf
———. 2013c. Fiscal Monitor: Fiscal Adjustment in an Uncertain 
World. Washington, DC, April.
———. 2015. Fiscal Monitor: The Commodities Roller Coaster. 
Washington, DC, October.
———. 2016. “Analyzing and Managing Fiscal Risk—Best 
Practices.” IMF Policy Paper, Washington, DC, available at 
https:// www .imf .org/ external/ np/ pp/ eng/ 2016/ 050416 .pdf
 ———. 2018. “How to Select Fiscal Rules. A Primer” IMF 
How-To-Note, Washington, DC, available at https:// www .imf 
.org/ en/ Publications/ SPROLLs/ How -To -Notes
———, and World Bank. 2012. “Revisiting the Debt Sus-
tainability Framework for Low Income Countries.” IMF 
Policy Paper. http:// www .imf .org/ external/ np/ pp/ eng/ 
2012/ 011212 .pdf.
Ostry, J., A. Ghosh, and R. Espinoza. 2015. “When Should 
Public Debt Be Reduced?” IMF Staff Discussion Note 15/10, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Price, R.W.R., T. T. Dang, and Y. Guillemette. 2014. “New 
Tax and Expenditure Elasticity Estimates for EU Budget 
Surveillance.” Economics Department Working Paper 1174, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment, Paris.
Schaechter, A., T. Kinda, N. Budina, and A. Weber. 2012. 
“Fiscal Rules in Response to the Crisis—Toward the 
Next-Generation Rules. A New Dataset.” IMF Working Paper 
12/187, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.

